International Asia Pacific Symposium organized by Istanbul Gelisim University 23-24 October 2019
Pakistan and India have been locked in conflict, ever since they became independent states at the end of the British colonial rule in 1947. They have gone to war and have experienced regular bouts of high tension verging on the outbreak of hostilities. At the heart of the problem lies the disputed state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A plebiscite was promised under UN Security Council Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948. The Indian leaders had initially promised to abide by this international requirement but they subsequently reneged on their promises. Things have only gone from bad to worse. On 5 August this year through a presidential order, the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi forcibly annexed Kashmir by repealing Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which had hitherto given J&K a special status. An indefinite communication lockdown has been imposed since then, which is in violation of the basic human rights of the populace. Pakistan at the moment has been restricted to highlighting the heightened repression in Kashmir that can become the trigger of a nuclear war in the subcontinent.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the Kashmir dispute needs urgent resolution in the best interest of the two billion people residing in South Asia. This is only possible if the Kashmiris are allowed to decide about their own future and the countries involved in the conflict engage in a meaningful dialogue. This unfortunately isn’t happening because the Indians, while brutally suppressing the Kashmiris, aren’t willing to talk to Pakistan on Kashmir.
Apparently this seems to be a no-win situation for everybody because of long standing inflexible and rigid positions. This paper posits that Indian obduracy notwithstanding, a plebiscite can be held in Jammu & Kashmir under the aegis of the United Nations. A fair and free referendum will allow the Kashmiris to decide their own fate and can bring peace and stability in crisis prone South Asia.
Key words: Jammu & Kashmir, Plebiscite, United Nations, Conflict Resolution, Peace & Stability
Upon the partition of India in August 1947, the people of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) expected that their ruler would accede to Pakistan. This prevalent sentiment was based on the fact that the vast majority Kashmiris were Muslims like the Pakistanis and had familial and cultural ties with that country. Under the terms of Indian Independence Act 1947, the rulers of the 565 or so princely state were free to accede to either of the two newly independent states on the lapse of paramountcy. For some of local potentates – the Rajas, Maharajahs and Nawabs, who were enjoying limited autonomy under the British crown, there was little choice. They were either located in such a manner that they had to become part of the bigger entity surrounding them; or were simply too weak militarily or economically to defy the larger and more powerful state next to them or around them. Some were only postage stamp collection of villages and possibly did not have the potential to achieve the status of an independent Bantustan like existence. These smaller states just did not have the capacity to run an independent foreign, defense or monetary policy of their own after the British patronage was withdrawn. Accession, for most, therefore to one of the successor states was not a difficult decision.
Rulers of some states found the decision very difficult. Kashmir was a peculiar case. The Maharajah was a Hindu Dogra, whose ancestor Gulab Singh Dogra had purchased his fiefdom for a measly amount 75 hundred thousand Nanak Shahi rupees from the British after they had defeated the Sikhs. His long suffering population was overwhelmingly Muslim, some of them in Poonch district were veterans of the two world wars and were willing to fight to liberate their homeland if the repressive Maharajah thought otherwise. In many ways it suited Kashmiris to join Pakistan. Not only did they find comfort in the fact that they professed the same faith, the ease of doing business through Pakistan was more because the communication infrastructure of Kashmir passed through the territory that now belonged to Pakistan.
The Kashmiris were hoping that the Maharajah would keep their religious sentiments in mind and would accede to Pakistan. But this did not happen. The Maharaja wanted to remain independent. He sought to buy time by striking a standstill agreement with Pakistan. India did not sign a similar agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a Kashmiri pundit and had emotional attachment with the lands of his ancestors. Together with Lord Mountbatten, last Viceroy of India, who became the first Governor General of the dominion of India, Nehru was able to bring the territory of J&K under the control of India. The Radcliffe partition award was deliberately molded to allow India access to the state of J&K.
There was turbulence within Kashmir. In September 1947, the Maharajah’s forces attempted to change the demography by massacring hundreds and thousands of Muslims in Jammu. Those who were left were driven to West Punjab. In an effort to help their Muslim brethren in need, the tribesmen from the North West armed with primitive weapons and without any visible leadership piled into lorries and moved to Muzaffarabad and then to Srinagar to save their brethren. Meanwhile, an indigenous freedom struggle broke out in Kashmir after the partition of India. The Muslim soldiers of the Maharajah’s state forces rose in rebellion in Gilgit and the Poonchi former soldiers rose in revolt in the South. Muslim tribesmen from the former tribal areas entered the valley from Uri. India sent a Sikh battalion of the regular army into Srinagar to seize the airfield. Indian Civil Servant VP Menon claims that the Maharajah signed the IOS on 26 October and the Indian troops landed in Kashmir a day later. Pakistan has always contested this Indian narrative. It has been argued by those sympathetic to the Pakistani version that the Indians never made the IOS public and therefore there is something dubious about its veracity. Indians had intervened in Kashmir unilaterally without consent of the state party.
Kashmir – A Story of Illegalities and Repression
Not only was the state of J&K illegally made part of the Indian Union, utmost force and brutality was used to keep the subjects of the state subjugated. The promises of a plebiscite were ignored over the years until the Indian government changed tack and adopted the mantra that Kashmir was not disputed territory but an integral part of India. Forces of occupation have blatantly violated the basic human rights of the citizens by using the blanket cover of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (ASPA) and Public Safety Order (PSA). Rape, killing, forced disappearances and torture have been used as an instrument of policy. Pellet guns have blinded and scared young Kashmiris protesting against the high handedness of the authorities. Unmarked graves abound and thousands of widows and orphans have to been left to fend for themselves. A 43 page report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), released on July 8, 2019, has raised serious concerns about abuses by state security forces and armed groups. The situation in the valley of Kashmir has been referred to as the most beautiful prison in the world in an EU report. The atrocities in Kashmir have been on the radar of the Genocide Watch. Ever since August 5, this year, there has been a communication lockdown that has severed the ties of the populace of J&K from the outside world.
Kashmir’s special status was diluted over time until Article 370 was finally repealed by the government of Nirendra Modi on 5th of August 2019 through a presidential fiat. Thrown into the dustbin was also Article 35 A that prevented anyone outside the state to buy property in J&K. article 370 was the basis of J&K’s accession to the Indian union at a time when erstwhile princely states had the choice to join either India or Pakistan after their independence from the British rule in 1947. The article, which came into effect in 1949, exempted J&K state from the Indian constitution. It allowed the Indian-occupied Kashmir to make its own laws in all matters except finance, defense, foreign affairs and communications. It established a separate constitution and a separate flag and denied property rights in the region to the outsiders. That meant that the residents of the state live under different laws from the rest of the country in matters such as property ownership and citizenship. Article 35 A was introduced through a presidential order in 1954 to continue the old provisions of the territory regulations under article 370 of the Indian constitution. The article permits the local legislature in Indian-occupied Kashmir to define permanent residents of the region. It forbids outsiders from permanently settling, buying land, holding local government jobs or winning education scholarships in the region. The article was referred to as the permanent resident’s law.
Possible Solutions to the Kashmir Imbroglio
Various plans had been discussed from time. It has been on the agenda of the heads of states and diplomats, whenever India and Pakistan have been on talking terms. Scholars well conversant with the Kashmir problem have also from time to time to suggested possible solutions. Some of the more prominent ones are listed below.
Owen Dixon Plan of Regional Plebiscites
In 1950 Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian judge tasked by the UN to engage with the Indian and Pakistani governments to come up with a solution came with a plan to of regional plebiscites. His plan, it is suggested would have redrawn the boundaries of Kashmir on religious lines. He saw the river Chenab as a natural border. This would have meant that most of the Muslim-dominated areas of Indian-occupied Kashmir would have opted for Pakistan and the Hindu-dominated area such as Jammu would have remained with India.
The plan met with opposition from those with pro-independence sentiments. It was also feared that it would have caused large scale migration involving the displacement of many thousands of people. The problems notwithstanding, it is still considered one of the most viable plans.
A Partition Plan
The idea of a partition of the state of J&K and has been on the cards for a long time. It is said to have been among the issues discussed between General Ayub Khan and Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru. The sticking point has always been the nature of the partition and how the actual dividing line would be marked. A partition plan was offered by Pakistani Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon to the US envoy to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge, in Karachi on February 10, 1958. It is also said that during the parleys between Pakistani foreign minister Z.A. Bhutto and Indian external affairs minister Swaran Singh talks (1962-1963) the possibility of a partition of J&K was discussed.
In an op-ed published in the British newspaper Guardian in 2002, it was revealed that in some declassified files of the British Foreign Office, the United States and Britain had jointly broached the idea of partition of Kashmir with India and Pakistan in the mid-60s, soon after the Indo-China war. Apparently the idea failed to find traction with the parties to the conflict.
In 1998, a Kashmiri American businessman Farooq Kathwari assembled a group of western policymakers and academics to set up the Kashmir Study Group (KSG). The group soon published a set of possible resolutions, including an innovative arrangement on the pattern of Andorra, the tiny state which lies on the borders of France and Spain. It involved the reconstitution of part of J&K as a sovereign entity, in the same way as Andorra, with free access to and from both of its larger neighbors. The part of the state which was to be reconstituted would be determined through an internationally supervised agreement involving the Kashmiri people, India and Pakistan.
The resulting entity would have a secular, democratic constitution; distinct citizenship; a flag; and a legislature which would pass laws on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs. The proposal relies on India and Pakistan overseeing the defense of an independent Kashmiri entity, and jointly working out its funding.
The KSG proposed that there would be no change in the present line of control, but the whole entity would become a demilitarized zone. The plan did not try to avoid a particularly important question which has dogged the Kashmir dispute: the politics of ego and prestige attached to the claim on the area. Any real solution to the Kashmir problem, it was suggested, would have to be immune to the suggestion that it amounted to a defeat for either of the warring neighbors.
The Good Friday Agreement
Scholars such as Sumantra Bose have recommended the Good Friday Agreement between the Republic of Ireland, Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British Government as a possible model for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. The arrangement within this Agreement suggested a stage-wise approach including the demobilization of all para military forces, police reforms and reforms within the social, political and political institutions. It allowed the people to have dual citizenship.
The process of the Good Friday Agreement was based on inclusiveness. Sincere negotiations endorsed by a popular referendum was finally accepted by the people of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. This allowed for a system of election that led to permanent co-operation between both governments. It was also openly supported by the international community as it encouraged mutual respect, equality and peaceful means of peace reconciliation in the region. The most remarkable feature of this arrangement was the positive role of the respective leadership in conflict resolution. It transferred the conflict from the streets to genuine debating chambers, and focused on constitutional aspirations. It encouraged equal power sharing that was durable, creative and competent enough to forge national interests to find an acceptable compromise. It has been argued by Bose that India and Pakistan can benefit from this example.
The Musharraf Four Point Formula
President Musharraf was able to bring about a consensus with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the issue of Kashmir. The four point Musharraf formula aimed at making the Line of Control (LOC) ‘irrelevant.’ The idea was to move away from entrenched positions and arrive at a plan that was acceptable to all. The idea found mention in Gen Musharraf’s memoir published in 2006. Indian Prime Minister first alluded to this formula on March 24, 2006 in Amritsar.
This solution would have had reunited the various portions of J&K and granted it limited autonomy short of independence under a joint mechanism. It was expanded by his foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in his book covering his days in the ministry of foreign affairs. Unfortunately this idea could not come to fruition because Gen Musharraf’s star by that time was in decline and there weren’t many domestic takers for his out of the box solution.
Plebiscite – Still the Best Solution
It was India, who first took the issue of Kashmir to the UN for conflict resolution. A number of UN Security Councils were passed from 1948 to 1971 in a bid to resolve the issue. UN Security Council Resolution 47 (attached at the end of the article) specifically promised the people of J&K the right of self-determination. This is probably still the best possible solution to this long unresolved issue. If all stakeholders including the governments of Pakistan and India and the people of Kashmir including those parties and groups who represent them agree to it, a plan can be chalked out to hold a referendum possibly under the good offices of the UN or any other bloc, party or an individual honest broker acceptable to all.
Referendum have been held under the auspices of the UN before but still the arrangements/logistics of holding a plebiscite would require careful planning. The modalities of a referendum would involve such details as demilitarization or at least minimization of forces, establishing composition of the plebiscite administration, impartial monitoring system and fair means of announcing the results. The parties of the conflict will have equally share the cost of the referendum. The entire exercise would have to be conducted in a simultaneous timeframe, so that earlier results do not favor the results of the voting conducted at a later stage. Last but not least, fair implementation of the results could result in lasting peace.
The discussion on Kashmir and how to bring about peace in this troubled region is only be possible, if the Kashmiris themselves are allowed to decide their own fate. Towards this end, only a fair and free plebiscite can the end resolve the conflict and bring about peace and stability in crisis prone South Asia. Peace and stability in the region will reduce the high cost of security that can then be diverted towards the welfare of the people. India and Pakistan has the potential of US $ 40 billion bilateral trade. Currently all trade and commerce is suspended because of high tension. Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint. The slightest friction can cause a conflagration that can easily escalate into a nuclear war. The lives of over 2 billion people is threatened.
Occupied Kashmir has the dubious honor of being the most heavily militarized zone in the world. 900000 soldiers and paramilitary troops are controlling the lives of 8 million people with some extremely repressive laws to suppress legal dissent and to stifle the voices of Azadi (freedom). An indefinite communication lockdown has disrupted and paralyzed life since 5 August. The possibility of war in the South Asian subcontinent looms large over the horizon. This scenario has come to the fore after the incursion of the Indian Air force Into Pakistan’s sovereign territory on February 26 This Year And Pakistan’s Response There is a distinct possibility of war that can escalate into an exchange of nuclear weapons. There are speculations that India may stage a false flag operation to create a situation to attack Pakistan.
is time therefore that the outstanding Kashmir problem should be resolved
before another war breaks out. Plebiscite may just be the way out.
Text of the UNSCR 47
of 21 April 1948
[S/726] The Security Council,
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
Having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan,
Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting,
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,
Reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948;
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 (1948) of 20 January 1948 shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution,
representatives of . . . and . . . , and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end,
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan:
A. Restoration of peace and order
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:
(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State;
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council’s resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage;
(c) When the Indian forces have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification.
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.
8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.
9. The Government of India should, at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite.
Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.
(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing, any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State releases all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;
(b) There is no victimization;
(c) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.
C. General provisions
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.
Bose, Sumantra. “Sources of Conflict, Dimension of Peace,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 13 (Mar. 27 – Apr. 2, 1999): 762-768, Accessed October 18, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407796.
Chatta, Ilyas. “Terrible Fate: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Jammu’ Muslims in 1947,” Pakistan Vision, Vol 10, No. I, Punjab University. http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES /Artical%20-%207.pdf.
Egleston, Fredrick W. “The Kashmir Dispute and the Owen Dixon’s Report,” Australian Outlook, Vol. 5, Issue I (1951).
Indian Independence Act, 1947, accessed on October 15, 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-empire/collections1/collections2/1947-indian-independence-act/
Jameel, Muzamil. ‘A Guide to Kashmir Peace Plan, The Guardian, January 22, 2002. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/22/kashmir.india1
Kashmir: UN Reports Serious Abuses, Human Rights Watch.July 10, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/kashmir-un-reports-serious-abuses.
“‘Kashmir, World’s Most Beautiful Prison’: Cushnahan.” July 21, 2004. http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040721a.html.
“Kashmir special status explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?” Al Jazeera, August 6, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmir-special-status-explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html.
Kasuri, Khurshid Mahmud. Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: he Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 299-300.
Korbel, Josef Danger in Kashmir (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Lamb, Alistair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 (Karachi: OUP, 1993)
Lyon, Peter. ‘Ten Possible Solutions for Kashmir,’ Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopaedia (Cal.: ABC_Clio, 2008).
Sen, LP. Slender was the thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947-48 (Sangram Books, 1987).
Menon, VP. Integration of Indian States (Longmans Greel & Co, 1956)
Regen, Helen & Sofia Safi, Pakistan’s Imran Khan likens India’s actions in Kashmir to Nazism, Genocide Watch, https://www.genocidewatch.com/home/category/Kashmir.
Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
Noorani, A.G. “Plebescite in Kashmir: Stillborn or Killed.” Posted on February 16, 2017 in Human Rights, Kashmir, kashmir issue, Vol 11 No 4, reproduced by Criterion Quarterly. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/plebiscite-kashmir-stillborn-killed/
of UNSCR 47. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/47.
 Indian Independence Act, 1947, accessed on October 15, 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-empire/collections1/collections2/1947-indian-independence-act/
 Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 13.
 Alistair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 (Karachi: OUP, 1993), 111.
 Ilyas Chatta, “Terrible Fate: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Jammu’ Muslims in 1947,” Pakistan Vision, Vol 10, No. I, Punjab University, 117-136, Accessed October 20, 2019, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES /Artical%20-%207.pdf
 For details of Indian Army operations in Kashmir read LP Sen, Slender was the thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947-48 (Sangram Books, 1987).
 VP Menon, Integration of Indian States (Longmans Greel & Co, 1956), 276.
 Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 121-140.
 Kashmir: UN Reports Serious Abuses, , Human Rights Watch July 10, 2019, Accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/kashmir-un-reports-serious-abuses
 “‘Kashmir, World’s Most Beautiful Prison’: Cushnahan,” July 21, 2004, Accessed October 20, 2019, http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040721a.html.
 Helen Regen & Sofia Safi, Pakistan’s Imran Khan likens India’s actions in Kashmir to Nazism, Genocide Watch, Accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.genocidewatch.com/home/category/Kashmir
 “Kashmir special status explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?” Al Jazeera, August 6, 2019, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmir-special-status-explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html.
 Fredrick W. Egleston, “The Kashmir Dispute and the Owen Dixon’s Report,” Australian Outlook, Vol. 5, Issue I (1951): 3-4.
 A.G. Noorani, Plebescite in Kashmir: Stillborn or Killed, Posted on February 16, 2017 in Human Rights, Kashmir, kashmir issue, Vol 11 No 4, reproduced by Criterion Quarterly, Accessed October 20, 2019, http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/plebiscite-kashmir-stillborn-killed/
 Muzamil Jameel, ‘A Guide to Kashmir Peace Plan, The Guardian, January 22, 2002, Accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/22/kashmir.india1
 Peter Lyon, ‘Ten Possible Solutions for Kashmir,’ Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopaedia (Cal.: ABC_Clio, 2008), 160.
 Sumantra Bose, “Sources of Conflict, Dimension of Peace,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 13 (Mar. 27 – Apr. 2, 1999): 762-768, Accessed October 18, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407796.
 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 303.
 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: he Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 299-300.